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Every government faces a challenge to select an optimum policy to provide food 
supplies to the consumers at a reasonable price and maintain a reasonable nutritional 
standard.  The alternative policy options available are an uninterrupted market, imports, 
input subsidies, price support, combined policy developed by the combination of input 
subsidy and price support, and investment on research and infrastructure development. 
This paper analyses the impact of these options on consumers’ and producers’ welfare, 
tax revenue, and foreign exchange requirement. The import and input subsidy give net 
return to the society while price support generates net loss. The triple combined policy 
option generates the highest net return to the society when each import and input subsidy 
component is combined with price support in the ratio of 40 and 20 percent, respectively. 
The best policies to provide higher wheat supplies at lower prices and to improve the 
welfare of consumers and producers were investment on agricultural research and 
development of irrigation infrastructure in the long run, but for the short run, the first and 
the second best option were respectively the combined and the input subsidy policy.   
 
Each government faces the conflicting challenges of increasing the income of 
farmers and the nutritional status of urban and rural poor by providing food at 
reasonable prices.  Although the best solution in the long-run would be to increase 
production through technological changes, the alternatives available in the short-term 
are an uninterrupted free market, imports, input subsidies, and price support. 
In Pakistan, the main objectives of food policies in the past have been to 
achieve food security, provide low-price food to consumers, assure reasonable prices 
to producers, and boost agricultural production in the country.  The policies adopted 
to achieve these objectives were assured minimum price to the producers through the 
floor price mechanism, providing wheat-flour to the consumer through ration shops 
and supplying fertiliser and irrigation to the producers at subsidised prices.   
However, the impact of these policies on different objectives and various sectors of 
the society might be self-defeating and internally inconsistent.  The objective of this 
paper is to analyse the impact of the alternative food policy options adopted in the 
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wheat sector in Pakistan on the welfare of consumers, producers, government 
revenue, and foreign exchange requirements.  Such comparison would help policy-
makers in giving benefit to a particular sector of the society by making optimal 
allocations of this scarce resource. 
Wheat was selected in this analysis because of its significance in Pakistan’s 
economy.  It is a staple food, and provides more than half of all food calories.   
Grown on about 37 percent of the total cropped area, and 68 percent of the winter 
season cropped area, it accounts for 3.1 percent GDP of the country.  Almost 10 
percent of the total population is involved in its production, distribution, and 
processing activities [Pakistan (2000, 2000a)]. 
Section 1 discusses wheat availability in a historical perspective.  Section 2 
evaluates and compares alternative policy options and briefly outlines the 
methodology.  Section 3 elaborates the limitation of the study, while Section 4 
summarises the results. 
 
1.  WHEAT AVAILABILITY IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Before analysing the impact of alternative policies, a brief history of wheat 
production and marketing will be helpful in understanding the overall wheat policy 
environment in the country.  Wheat production in Pakistan can be divided into three 
distinct periods: the pre-Green Revolution period, before the release of high-yielding 
wheat varieties (1948–66); the Green Revolution period, when modern inputs such 
as high-yielding varieties, fertiliser, and irrigation were rapidly adopted (1967–76); 
and the post-Green Revolution period, when additional gains of modern inputs 
slowed down considerably (1977–2000). 
The growth in wheat production and the relative share of area and yield in 
production increase during the three periods are given in Table 1.  The average 
annual growth rate of wheat production during the Green Revolution and in the pre-
revolution,  and post-revolution  eras  were  1.5 percent, 5.1 percent, and 3.3 percent,  
 
Table 1 
Rates of Growth of Wheat Area, Yield, and Production for 
Various Periods in Pakistan 
Growth Rate (%) in   
Area Yield  Production 
Percentage Increase in 
Production Due to Yield 
Pre-Green Revolution Era  1.5  0  1.5  0 
Green Revolution Era  0.5  4.6  5.1  90 
Post-Revolution Era  1.4  2.0  3.4  41 
Sources:  Pakistan (Various Issues) Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan. 
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respectively.  During 1948–1966, all the increase in wheat production was derived 
from area increase.  That trend was sharply reversed between 1967 and 1976 when 
the growth rate of wheat yields rose at 4.6 percent per annum and contributed a 
major share in wheat production.  Since 1977, however, the rate of yield increase 
slowed down to only 2 percent per annum, well below the population growth rate.  
Although growth in wheat production in the last period has been reasonable, area 
increase accounted for 41 percent of production growth.  
There are two distinct periods with respect to government policies to assure 
wheat supply in the country.  In the first period, until 1971, the prices were kept 
higher than the international market prices after converting the latter at wholesale 
level; since then it has turned the other way round (Table 2).  There seemed to be 
two objectives of the government food policies during the 1970s and 1980s: (1) to 
keep domestic wheat prices low for the benefit of urban and rural landless poor, and 
(2) to discourage the private sector involvement in wheat services sector, such as 
wheat storage, transportation, and distribution. 
Fixing wheat flour prices and protecting these prices by government 
involvement in wheat marketing were the mechanisms through which farm-gate 
prices were kept low, albeit the original purpose of these mechanisms was to provide 
a reasonable price to farmers.  Government involvement in marketing was operated 
through a ration-shop network, public sector flour mills nationalised during the mid-
seventies,
1  and direct involvement of Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services 
Corporation (PASSCO). 
To discourage the private sector involvement in wheat marketing, a narrow 
margin between farm-gate and release prices to flour mills was maintained, although 
this was never a set objective of these organisations.  Furthermore, no difference in 
the release price in different regions and different times of the year was kept.  The 
ultimate result was interdiction of the private sector to bid prices up to the 
equilibrium level, and it created an inefficient marketing system.  
Below-equilibrium prices of wheat and wheat flour naturally created a gap 
between supply and demand, forced the government to import around one million tons of 
wheat per year to fill the gap, and bear subsidy for urban consumers equal to the 
difference in international and domestic prices.  The import and the higher production 
caused by the Green Revolution improved the average per capita availability from 
domestic production of 82 kilograms in the pre-Revolution period (1961–67) to 123 
kilograms in the post-Revolution period (1977–2000). The objective of this paper is to 
show that the same objective of increasing per capita consumption could have been 
achieved by alternative policies and with different implications for producers, consumers,  
 
1Although small mills—less than a given capacity—were allowed to do the business, yet the 
government sector flour mills heavily dominated the market.  In early 1980s, the government 
denationalised the flourmills but continued operating through ration shops to provide food to the poor at 
low prices.  With the abolition of ration shop, the flour mills in the country were privileged to purchase 
any amount of wheat from the Food Department at the release price fixed by the government. Abedullah and Ali  206
Table 2 













   (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (d)–(b) 
1961 94.58  58.70  70  –22.14 
1962 89.83  64.30  77  –12.67 
1963 83.41  64.66  78  –5.82 
1964 91.15  67.60  81  –10.03 
1965 100.40  59.52  71  –28.98 
1966 90.78  62.83  75  –15.39 
1967 136.23  65.77  79  –57.31 
1968 122.12  62.83  75  –46.73 
1969 95.92  58.42  70  –25.81 
1970 106.69  62.83  75  –31.29 
1971 108.77  62.30  75  –34.01 
1972 100.87  69.10  83  17.95 
1973 58.50  136.60  164  105.42 
1974 76.52  178.00  214  137.08 
1975 119.92  138.40  166  46.16 
1976 106.71  122.70  147  40.53 
1977 112.14  98.70  118  6.30 
1978 133.26  124.90  150  16.62 
1979 139.86  155.20  186  46.38 
1980 145.72  168.30  202  56.24 
1981 158.66  154.60  186  26.86 
1982 138.52  132.60  159  20.60 
1983 142.82  137.30  165  21.94 
1984 147.82  140.20  168  20.42 
1985 145.13  128.70  154  9.31 
1986 132.03  118.40  142  10.05 
1987 120.60  112.10  135  13.92 
1988 114.55  140.70  169  54.29 
1989 117.43  161.30  194  76.13 
1990 122.40  129.10  155  32.52 
1991 124.17  126.10  151  27.15 
1992 138.97  145.10  174  35.15 
1993 124.62  135.00  162  37.14 
1994 147.07  135.00  166  19.25 
1995 100.82  146.00  175  74.38 
1996 107.77  210.67  253  145.03 
1997 121.80  165.33  198  76.60 
1998 102.84  136.00  163  60.36 
1999 111.68  112.67  135  23.52 
2000 116.27  104.33  125  8.93 
Sources: Government of Pakistan, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. Wheat Self-sufficiency and Their Likely Impacts  207
and government revenue.  Recently, Ashfaq, et al. (2001) estimated producer’s loss, 
consumer’s gain, cost to the government, and net welfare  loss to the society over time by 
employing the static and dynamic welfare analysis approach.  That paper analyses the 
impact of only the price policy on different groups of the economy but does not include 
analysis and discussion for other alternative policies such as import, input subsidy, and 
combined policy options, so as to take care of the interest of all groups in the society.  
The present study aims to fill this gap.  We follow the work of Barker and Hayami 
(1976), Ahmed (1979) and Bayes, et al. (1985) to discuss different policy options. 
 
2.  ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS 
In the following sections, we evaluate and compare different policy options 
that can be adopted to ensure reasonable wheat consumption.  In Figure 1, S0 
represents the domestic supply of wheat at the existing prices of fertiliser. The 
producers used at home was assumed to be 52 percent of the total production 
[Hamid, Pinckney, and Valdes (1988)]. The line DD represents total demand 
corresponding to each level of price, and the horizontal distance between Hh and DD 
vertical line Hh indicates the producer’s demand for home consumption (the 
amount of wheat that producers kept at home for their own family consumption) 






















Fig. 1.  Analysis of Wheat Import and Price Support Policy. Abedullah and Ali  208
that lines measures the total quantity of wheat marketed in the country by local 
producers.
2  The domestic price Pd in the figure is lower than the equilibrium price 
Pe.  Domestic supply at Pd is Q0 but the total demand is Qc.  This difference in 
supply and demand of wheat at the price Pd creates a gap of (Qc–Q0) in the country.  
At least five alternatives are available to fill this gap: (1) Free market option, (2) 
import wheat equivalent of the gap, (3) price support that requires government to 
buy output from wheat producers at a higher price and sell it to consumers at a 
lower price, (4) input subsidy to shift the supply curve by encouraging input use, 
and (5) a combination of import, price support, and input subsidy with different 
proportions. 
 
2.1.   Free Market Option 
One of the options available to the government is to leave the market 
uninterrupted.  In periods of acute shortfalls in domestic production or imports, 
consumer prices may become intolerably high if the situation is left entirely to the 
free market-mechanism, which will balance the excess demand with supply through 
the device of high prices.  High prices are particularly harsh on the low-income 
consumers because the high-income affluent consumers may bid the limited supply 
away from them.  To understand its implications on production and consumption, we 
estimated the equilibrium price and quantity given the supply and demand elasticities 
of wheat. 
Irrespective of methodology and type of data, the short-run supply elasticity 
of wheat is estimated by different researchers and varies from 0.06 to 0.47, and the 
detail is given in Farooq and Iqbal (2000).  The demand and supply curves in 
Figure 2 are drawn assuming the wheat demand and supply elasticities of –0.31 
and 0.23, respectively.
3   The intercept of supply curve was adjusted to show a 
total production of 16.07 million tons (t) while the intercept of demand curve was 
adjusted to show a total demand of 19.37 million t (16.07 million t production + 
1.8 million t imports + 1.5 million t change in government stock) at the existing 
wholesale price of 7974 rupees per t in 1999-2000 [Pakistan (2000)].
4  The demand and 
supply equations with these assumptions are Q 
d
0 =313.8(P0)–0.31 and Q 
s
0 = 2.04(P0)0.23, 
respectively.  Solving these equations simultaneously gave the equilibrium price at Rs 
11269 per ton and equilibrium quantity at 17.40 million tons for 1999-2000.  Had 
the  government  fixed  support  price  proportionately higher  (41  percent  higher,  
 
2The demand curve representing the quantity sold in the local market is not drawn separately. It 
would run parallel to the demand curve (DD) at its left at a distance equal to the difference between Hh 
and DD. 
3The supply elasticity of wheat was taken from Ali (1990), and the demand elasticity from 
Alderman (1988).  Both the figures referred to the short-run elasticities. 
4One-year lag has been taken between consumption and production, as production for this year 
will last until the end of next year. Wheat Self-sufficiency and Their Likely Impacts  209



































Fig. 2. Equilibrium Quantity and Price of Wheat. 
 
keeping all the marketing subsidies as such), there would not have been any import 
of wheat during the year.  Higher prices would have encouraged wheat supply and 
discouraged wheat consumption to match supply and demand at the equilibrium 
price. 
However, the equilibrium price may be undesirable either because the 
equilibrium quantity thus produced is still too small to supply enough food or, even 
if it result in the production of enough food, it may be beyond the reach of the urban 
and landless rural poor.  To take care of the second concern, lower than equilibrium 
price was fixed at Rs 7974 per t, which encouraged consumption but discouraged 
production and thus created a gap of 3.3 million t between supply and demand. 
In the following section, the implications of the other four policy options are 
compared to the free market option with respect to the welfare of consumers, 
producers, government revenues, and foreign exchange requirements.  Comparing 
the policy interventions to the free market equilibrium option does not imply that we 
prefer the latter option to advocate self-sufficiency.  This is simply a reference point 
for the purpose of comparing the alternative policy options. 
 
2.2.  Welfare Implications of Imports 
Since 1971, wheat prices in Pakistan have been kept lower than the 
equilibrium and import parity prices in the international market (Table 2).  To fill the 
gap thus created, government has had to import 5–20 percent of the demand.  Figure 
1 was drawn to explain the welfare implication of this policy in one year.  During Abedullah and Ali  210
1999-2000, the controlled price (Pd), the import parity prices (Pw), and the 
equilibrium price (Pe) were respectively Rs 7974, Rs 8586, and Rs 11269 per ton, 
while wheat consumption (Qc) and production (Q0) were 19.37 and 16.07 million 
tons, respectively [Pakistan (2000)].  The difference in Qc and Q0 was met from 
import (1.8 million tons) and stock adjustment (1.5 million tons).  The welfare 
implication of this policy is documented in Table 3. 
Only consumers gained through this policy. All other parties, i.e., the 
government and the producers have to pay for it.  Consumers’ gain was higher than 
the total loss paid by the producers and the government together.  Therefore, the 
policy produced net gain to the society and the rate of return on the policy was 58 
percent (Table 3). 
The government cost would be lower, if the import is a food-aid.  In the above 
example, if 50 percent of the imports were food-aid, then government had to incur 
only half of the cost, and net return to the society would be higher than that resulting 
from the absence of food-aid. 
 
2.3.   Input Subsidy 
The gap between consumption and production could be filled by shifting the 
supply curve from S0 to S2 (in Figure 1).  Since a supply curve represents the rising 
portion of the marginal cost curve, one of the options to shift the supply curve to the 
right is to be exercised by lowering the input prices.  Given the production elasticity 
of fertiliser in wheat, we can determine how much fertiliser is required to obtain the 
target increase in output. Then, knowing the price elasticity of demand for fertiliser, 
one can calculate the decline in price that will induce the additional required fertiliser 
consumption. 
It is assumed that 80 percent of total consumption of fertiliser in the rabi 
season is being used in wheat production and the remaining in the minor crops.  The 
demand curve of fertiliser for wheat is Df0 Df0 (Fig. 3), and the quantity demanded 
for wheat production at the existing prices of Pfd is X0. The demand will increase to 
XS in Figure 3 if the government decides to subsidise fertiliser use in wheat 
production for the purpose of shifting the wheat supply curve from S0 to S2 in Figure 
1, to fill the present gap in its production and consumption.  The supply curve of 
fertiliser is assumed to be infinitely elastic at the world price level.  Consideration of 
an upward sloping domestic supply curve has been avoided because it will involve 
subsidising of the fertiliser industry. 
Assume that government decides to produce (Qe–Q0)/Qe=11 percent deficient 
wheat within the country.  Further assume the short-run supply elasticity of wheat 
with respect to fertiliser price is –0.185 [Ali (1990) a mean of –0.25; Tweeten 
(1982)] –0.12, and the price of fertiliser would have to be reduced by (1/0.185)*11 = 
61 percent to produce an additional 11 percent wheat.  This will reduce the nitrogen 
and phosphorus fertiliser prices to 4.38  and  10.63 rupees per kilogram, respectively,  Wheat Self-sufficiency and Their Likely Impacts  211
Table 3 
Costs and Benefits of Import, Input Subsidy and Price Support Policies 
  Formula Used to Estimate the  Gain or Loss in 
  Policy  Corresponding Component  Million Rupees 
Import 
(a) Consumers’ Gain  (Qe – H)* (Pe – Pd) + 0.5* (Qc–Qe)* (Pe – Pd) (fig 1)  33046 
(b) Producers’ Loss  (Qe–H)* (Pe–Pd) - 0.5*(Qe – Q0)* (Pe– Pd) (fig 1)  27610 
(c) Government Cost  (Qc–Q0)* ( Pw - Pd) (fig 1)  2020 
(d) Foreign Exchange Requirement  (Qc–Q0)* Pw (fig 1)  28335 
(e) Cost of Engaging Foreign 
     Exchange for 6 Months at the  
     Rate of 10% Per Annum (Interest)    1417 
(f) Total Cost of the Policy  (c+e)  3437 
(g) Net Gain (+) or Loss (–) 
     to the Society  (a–b–f)  2000 
(h) Rate of Return of the Policy  ((g/f)*100) 58% 
Input Subsidy 
(a) Consumers’ Gain  (Qe – H)*(Pe – Pd) + 0.5*(Qc – Qe)*(Pe – Pd) (fig 1)  33046 
(b) Producers’ Loss  (Qc – Qe)*Pd –(Qe – H)*(Pe – Pd) (fig 1) 
 –  [PfS*(OXS – OX0)–(Pfd – PfS)*(OX0)] (fig 3)  6061 
(c) Fertiliser Cost to Govt.  ((Pfd – Pfs)*(OX0) + (Pfw–Pfs)*(Xs – X0))*1000 (fig 3)  20706 
(d) Foreign Exchange Requirement 
     to Import Fertiliser  (XS – X0)*Pfw (fig 3)  9071 
(e) Interest Cost on Foreign  
Exchange Engaged in Fertiliser  
Import for 6 Months at the Rate of  
10% Per Annum      454 
(f) Total Cost to the Government  (c+e)    21160 
(g) Net Benefits to the Society  (a–b–f)    5825 
(h) Rate of Return of the Policy  ((g/f)*100)   28% 
Price Support 
(a) Consumers’ Gain  (Qe – H)*(Pe – Pd) + 0.5*(Qc – Qe)*(Pe – Pd) (fig 1)  33046 
(b) Producers’ Gain  (Qc – H)*(PS – Pe) –0.5*(Qc – Qe)*(PS – Pe) (fig 1)  67121 
(c) Cost to the Government  (Qc – H)*(PS – Pd) (fig 1)  110002 
(d) Foreign Exchange Required to 
      Import Fertiliser  (XS – X0)*Pfw (fig 3)  9071 
(e) Interest on the Foreign Exchange 
     for 6 Months      454 
(f) Total Cost to the Government  (c+e)    110456 
(g) Net Benefits (+) or Loss (–) 
      to the Society  (a+b–c)    –9835 
(h) Rate of Return of the Policy  ((g/f)*100)   –9% 
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instead of the current prices of 11.27 and 27.38 rupees per kilogram and thus create 
an additional demand of nitrogen and phosphorus.
5  Under the assumption that 
government will fill the additional demand of fertiliser (nitrogen and phosphorus) by 
purchasing from the international market, the level of subsidy in nitrogen and 
phosphorus will be (20.04–  4.38) = 15.7 and (19.20–10.63) = 8.6 rupees per 
kilogram, respectively.
6  Assuming fertiliser demand elasticity equal to 0.50 [Salam 
(1982)], the 61 percent reduction in fertiliser prices will stipulate the current use of 
soil nutrients in wheat from 1.2 million ton [Pakistan (2000)] to 1.56 million ton.  
Multiplying the new nutrient levels with per unit fertiliser subsidy will give a total 
cost of the policy.
7   
The additional fertiliser requirement can be met either by expanding the 
domestic industry or by importing from the international market, both having the 
same cost under a competitive market situation.  However, local industry cannot 
meet the additional demand in the short term.  Therefore, government decides to 
bring all the additional fertiliser from import.  The foreign exchange requirements 
will be worth of 9071 million rupees, to import 0.46 million tons of additional soil 
nutrients.
8  The net return to the producer is negative because of loss to the producer 
(due to the lower domestic price of wheat than the equilibrium price as represented 
by the area LMGC in Figure 1) and is more than double the benefit obtained due to 
the increase in output value (due to higher level of fertiliser use) equal to the area 
AQcQeG.  However, net saving from fertiliser use because of low fertiliser price as 
represented by the area IPfdPfSK (Pfd is the present farm level price for fertiliser) 
minus additional fertiliser cost equal to the area LXSX0K in Figure 3 is positive.  The 
welfare implications of the policy to all concerned parties are reported in Table 3.  
The consumer’s gain is higher than the sum of the loss to producer and cost to the 
government and, therefore, it generates a net benefit to the society.  The net rate of 
return of the policy is 28 percent.  
Similarly, the rate of return of government subsidy on irrigation water can 
also be estimated.  Actually, government should evaluate subsidy on different inputs, 
and then their decision should be based on the rate of return of the policy. For 
example, 55 percent additional water will be required to produce 11 percent wheat, 
assuming  production  elasticity  with  respect  to  irrigation  water  0.2 [Hussain and  
 
5The weighted average fertiliser prices were estimated as the weighted average price of N and P 
with relative share of each nutrient in the total nutrient (N+P) consumption. The N price was estimated 
from urea, while P price was estimated from DAP after deducting the N cost evaluated at N price from 
urea and N content in DAP. 
6The international prices are taken from the World Bank publication Commodity Trade and Price 
Trends (various issues). Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 
7Due to the difficulties of controlling fertiliser subsidy exclusively for wheat crop, some of the 
advantage of the policy will be seen in other crops grown in the rabi season.  
8It can be assumed that the domestic fertiliser industry can produce the additional fertiliser needed 
to implement the policy at the same cost in the long term. In this case, foreign exchange requirement to 
import fertiliser will cease, but foreign exchange requirement to import machinery will increase. Wheat Self-sufficiency and Their Likely Impacts  213
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Fig. 3. Effect of Fertiliser Subsidy on Price and Demand. 
 
Young (1985)]—the rabi-season water availability has to increase from the current 
level of 56 million acre feet to 87 million acre feet to produce deficient wheat. The 
cost of producing 31 million acre feet of water will be 10850 million rupees, 
assuming the additional water cost (net of additional water recoveries) is equal to 
350 rupees per acre feet.
9  The increase in consumers’ and producers’ surplus will be 
(b+c) 15214 million rupees, giving a net gain of 4364 million rupees or rate of return 
of 40 percent.  Similarly, the joint effect of increase in fertiliser and irrigation water 
can also be analysed.   Combining the input subsidy policies can improve the 
production elasticity of each input due to the complementary effect.  Thus further 
improvement is expected in net benefit and rate of return. 
 
2.4.  Price Support 
The purpose of price support policy is to encourage production (above the 
equilibrium level) within the country so that the consumption could be supported 
from the local supply at a higher level than equilibrium because the equilibrium level 
of consumption is too low and is not enough to provide the required necessary 
calories for the human body.  This can be achieved by offering a higher (than 
equilibrium) price to the farmers to produce enough wheat quantities for consumers’ 
 
9It should be noted that, unlike in fertiliser, water prices need not be changed to induce additional 
water demand, because canal water prices are already very low and high potential demand exists at the 
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demanded at a lower (than equilibrium) price.  Both producer and consumer will 
benefit in this case, but the government has to bear the cost. 
Assuming a fixed domestic supply curve S0, an increase in the production of 
wheat to the desired level of OQc can be achieved by supporting the producer price at 
OPS level in Figure 1.  Since the government maintains the consumers’ price at Pd 
level, increase in the production of wheat would involve a cost to the government 
equal to the area AENM.  Area CENL represents an increase in the income of wheat 
producers, and CLMA represents an increase in consumers surplus at a cost to the 
government. 
The government encouraged wheat consumption during 1999-2000 by fixing 
a lower price (Pd) at Rs 7974 than the equilibrium price (Pe) of Rs 11269 per ton.  
This resulted in more than equilibrium consumption.  Now if the government had 
decided to give a higher wheat price to their own producers, so that they could 
produce (Qc) amount of wheat within the country rather than import it from outside, 
it had to offer (Ps) prices to the producer.  The Ps was estimated from the supply 
response function by substituting the required quantity on the left-hand side of the 
equation and solving for price.  This gave the support price (Ps) of Rs 17962 per ton.  
The welfare implications of this policy against the policy of completely relying on 
market forces were estimated and the results are reported in Table 3.  This policy has 
generated a negative return to the society because of the higher cost to the 
government than the sum of the benefits to the consumers and producers. 
The additional production (Qc–Q0) required additional input use.  If additional 
production was planned to be obtained from higher fertiliser use, this would require 
import adjustments to keep domestic fertiliser prices constant.  In this case the 
demand curve for fertiliser will shift rightward, such that more fertiliser will be used 
at the given fertiliser prices.  As estimated in the previous section, fertiliser import 
requirement would be 0.46 million tons of nutrients, requiring Rs 9071 million worth 
of foreign exchange.  However, all cost of fertiliser imports will be recovered from 
farmers, as there is no subsidy on fertiliser use.  
 
2.5.  Combined Policy Options  
In practice, government rarely adopts a single policy option.  Generally, 
different policies are combined to achieve alternative goals.  Therefore, any attempts 
to derive optimal policy will be incomplete without incorporating the combined 
policy options.  Optimum combinations of alternative policies are determined using 
net benefits to the society as criteria.  The following section discusses how these 
combinations affect different sectors of the society.  Different combinations 
evaluated are: (1) import and input subsidy, (2) import and price support, (3) input 
subsidy and price support, (4) import, input subsidy, and price support. 
The eight different scenarios of combined policies were evaluated when two 
policies were combined at the ratio of 90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 60:40, 50:50, 40:60, Wheat Self-sufficiency and Their Likely Impacts  215
30:70, and 20:80.  As can be seen in import, input subsidy case, or price support, the 
consumer gain remains the same in all these policies, as these do not affect 
equilibrium and domestic prices. Therefore, in the combined policy options, the 
effect on consumer’s surplus is not discussed. 
The fertiliser component of the policy shifts the supply curve to the right from 
S0 to S1 (Figure 1), while price support component creates an incentive for producers 
and attracts them to produce at a higher level along the new supply curve.  The 
fertiliser subsidy component yields additional output of (Q
/
c–Q0) at the given price Pd 
and the remaining gap of (Qc–Q
/
c) is filled by the price support component of the 
policy by giving higher prices to farmers at Pc.  In the combined policy, a lower 
support price Pc than in the single price-support policy Ps is required.  Similarly, a 
relatively low shift in demand for fertiliser (X0 to Xc) and reduction in fertiliser 
prices (Pfd to Pfc) will be required in this case. The combined policy induced the 
fertiliser use in wheat production from X0 to Xc (Figure 3).  
 
2.5.1.   Input Subsidy and Price Support 
Among various combinations available in the combined policy, producer gain 
increases as the share of input subsidy decreases, or the share of price support increases.  
The cost to the government increases with the increase in price support component in the 
combined policy option.  Both net benefit and rate of return for each policy option are 
moving parallel to each other.  First both are increasing, and then decreasing with the 
increase in price support component.  The maximum benefit to the society (4520 million 
rupees) is observed when input subsidy and price support components are combined in 
the ratio of 70:30, which is different than the policy where the highest rate of return, 13.4 
percent, is observed at the ratio of 80:20 (Table 4). 
 
2.5.2.   Import and Input Subsidy 
When import and input subsidy are combined, producer’s gain continuously 
increases with the increase in input subsidy component but remains negative for all 
possible combinations of the two policies.  The cost to the government increases with 
the increase in input subsidy and the decrease in import component in the combined 
policy option.  The net benefit to the society is found to be optimal (6593 million 
rupees) when import and input subsidy components are combined in the ratio of 50:50 
(Table 4).  The rate of return on the policy is optimal 71 percent for the second policy 
option (where import and input subsidy are in the ratio of 80:20), which is different 
than the policy where net benefit to the society becomes optimal 50:50. 
 
2.5.3.  Import and Price Support 
The producer’s gain continuously increases (from negative to positive) with 
the  decrease in import and the increase in price support components of the combined  Table 4 
Costs and Benefits of Combined Input Subsidy, Import, and Price Support Policies 
(Million Rupees Per Annum) 
Policy Criterion  1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8 
         I+II
a 90+10  80+20  70+30  60+40 50+50  40+60 30+70  20+80 
Combined Input Subsidy and Price Support 
Consumers Benefit  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046 
Producers’ Loss (–) or gain (+)  –6137  –276  6002  12757  20054  27960  36545  45882 
Cost to the Government  24311  28893  34528  41292  49267  58539  69197  81336 
Net Benefit to the Society  2598  3877  4520  4512  3834  2468  394  –2408 
Rate of Return on the Policy (%)  11  13.4  13.1  11  8  4  1  –3 
 
Combined Import and Input Subsidy Policies 
Consumers Benefit  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046 
Producers Loss (–)  –24791  –22236  –19935  –17899  –16137  –14653  –13456  –12551 
Cost to the Government  4846  6331  7888  9518  11217  12984  14818  16717 
Net Benefit to the Society  3403  4480  5223  5629  5693  5409  4772  3779 
Rate of Return on the Policy (%)  70  71  66  59  51  42  32  23 
 
Combined Import and Price Support 
Consumers’ Benefit  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046  33046 
Producers’ Loss (–) or Gain (+)  –21040  –13978  –6371  –1836  10702  20285  30651  41865 
Cost to the Government  9067  15613  23147  31746  41488  52459  64746  78442 
Net Benefit to the Society  2939  3455  3528  3137  2260  873  –1049  –3531 
Rate of Return on the Policy (%)  32  22  15  10  5  2  –2  –5 
  a Policies 1 to 8 are all combined policies, such that policy 1 has 90 percent  component of the first policy and 10 percent  component of the second policy in each 
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policy.  Producer’s gain remains negative until price support component is equal to 
or less than 30 percent in the combined policy option.  The cost to the government 
continuously increases with the decrease in import and increase in price support 
component of the two combined policies.  The net benefit to the society is optimal 
(3528 million rupees) when 70 percent of extra demand is imported and 30 percent is 
contributed by the price support component.  The rate of return on the policy is 
found to be optimal when import and price support policies are combined in the ratio 
of 90:10 (Table 4).   
If the objective is to maximise the benefit of the whole society, but not any 
particular group of the society, then under 3 combined policy scenario and 8 
available options under each scenario, the best policy option is the 5th policy under 
scenario 2, when import and input subsidy component are combined in the ratio of 
50 and 50.  However, if the preference is to protect the Government by taking care of 
other groups in the society as well, then the best policy option is the 1st policy of 
scenario 2, when import and input subsidy components are combined in the ratio of 
90 and 10.   
  
2.5.4.  Combination of Three Policies 
Import, fertiliser input subsidy, and price support are combined in different 
proportions and the distribution of loss and benefits among consumers, producers, and 
government are reported in Table 5.  The optimal net benefit (6402 million rupees) to the 
society is observed under the policy where each of the import and fertiliser subsidy 
components is 40 percent and price support component is 20 percent (i.e., policy 3 in 
Table 5).  The producer’s loss under this option amounts to 4950 million rupees, and cost 
to the government is 21694 million rupees.  The government can reduce its cost by 
(21694–10477) = 11217 million rupees if it decides to fill the total gap in demand and 
supply in such a way that each input subsidy and price support component contributes 10 
percent, and if the remaining 80 percent is contributed by import component.  This policy 
also generated the highest rate of return of 35 percent among all three combined policy 
options.  However, producer’s loss increases in this case by (18313–4950) = 13363 
million rupees, and net gain to the society will be 2146 million rupees less than the earlier 
policy where the net return was maximum (i.e., policy 3 in Table 5).  Similarly, if import, 
input subsidy, and price support are combined in the proportion of 30:30:40, rather than 
selecting an optimum policy in terms of the highest net benefit to the society or the 
highest rate of return, the producers’ benefits will be turned to a positive of 8489 million 
rupees.  However, it will impose an extra burden of (36197–21694) = 14503 million 
rupees on the public exchequer, and at the same time net benefit to the society will 
decrease by (6402–5339) = 1063 million rupees.  Now, under the assumption that the 
policy-maker’s objective is to maximise the net benefit to the society, the best policy 
under all possible triple combined policy options is policy 3.  However, if the objective is  Table 5 
Costs and Benefits of Combined Import, Input Subsidy and Price Support Policies 
 (Million Rupees Per Annum) 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8    9 
     I+II+III
b 20+20+60  30+30+40  40+40+20  20+60+20 30+40+30  40+20+40 80+10+10 60+20+20 40+30+30
a
 
Consumers’  Benefit  33046  33046  33046 33046  33046 33046  33046 33046 33046 
Producers’ Gain (+) or Loss (–)  24638  8489  –4950  –2043  2317  6527  –18313  –8947  536 
Cost to the Government  55352  36197  21694  25160  29228  34639  10477  18507  27598 
Net Benefit to the Society  2332  5339  6402  5844  6136  4935  4257  5593  5984 
Rate of Return on the Policy (%)  4  13  26  20  18  12  35  26  19 
a Policies 1 to 9 are all combined policies, such that policy 1 has 20 percent of import component, 20 percent of fertiliser input subsidy component, and 60 
percent of price support component.   
b I, II, and III represent wheat import, fertiliser input subsidy, and price support component of the combined policy respectively. Wheat Self-sufficiency and Their Likely Impacts  219
to seek the maximum rate of return, then the best option is policy 7.  Similarly, 
policy-makers can choose the policy where producers are gaining at the cost to the 
government, such as policy 1, 2, or 6 in Table 5.   
 
3.   LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
It should be pointed out that the partial equilibrium model was used to 
evaluate the effect of alternative policies subject to a number of limitations.  While 
the model does have some value, there is also a risk of drawing unwarranted 
assessment and policy conclusions from it. 
First of all, the analysis is “excessively” partial.  For instance, an introduction 
of modern technology can shift the supply curve towards right and it may reduce 
producers’ surplus from the crop under consideration.  However, yield-increasing 
and price-reducing technology may mean that less land has to be used for the 
production of the same quantity of crop.  This will enable use of more land for 
producing crops other than wheat.  One can conceive of cases where producers’ 
surplus increases, since resources are released that are used to expand supplies of 
other crops.  The outcome depends on the degree of substitution of one crop for 
another in the cultivation process. 
Second, technological change can cause a supply curve to shift in diverse 
ways, and the supply curve may not be of the mathematical form assumed in this 
model.   The analysis in this paper, in parallel to Hayami and Herdt (1977), considers 
only one type of shift.  The nature of supply shift can significantly influence the 
distribution of benefit between consumers and producers.  This has been widely 
discussed in the recent literature.  Duncan and Tisdell (1971) demonstrated that the 
nature of the supply shift is a critical determinant of the distribution of benefits 
between producers and consumers, and the studies by Lund, et al. (1980); Wise 
(1978,1981); Krishna (1984) and Sukhatme and Abler (1997) also underlined this. 
Third, the demand curve in this analysis is fixed.  This implies that the 
effects of policies are not closed.  For example, if the per capita income rises due 
to technological change, its effects on per capita wheat consumption and 
population growth are not predicted.  Unlike the Malthusian or Ricardian models, 
population and per capita consumption are exogenous variables in this model.   
These could be endogenous variables.  The possibility that technological change 
could, in the case of an important subsistence crop, increase income and 
population—as well as the shift in demand for the product—is not considered.  For 
instance, the following equation shows the effect of population growth on demand 
[Johnston and Mellor (1961)]. 
D = n+eg  
where D, n and g are annual growth rates in food demand, population and per capita 
income, respectively, while e is the income elasticity of demand.  The second term Abedullah and Ali  220
on the right-hand side is likely to be technology-induced, while the growth of 
population could contain both endogenous and exogenous elements. 
Fourth, this model does not consider variability in production, which is 
expected to have some influence on welfare.  If some policy leads to greater 
variability in production and hence the supply food grains, their prices become more 
unstable.  In the LDCs this can have an important welfare implication for low-
income earners and can increase the fluctuation in incomes received by the grain 
producers [Mellor (1978)].  Furthermore, the question of sustainability is an 
important aspect of policies, which is not considered here.  
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Each government faces a conflicting challenge to improve the nutrition status 
of population, to increase the income of the farmer, and to provide food to the urban 
population and the landless rural poor at a reasonable price.  The options available 
are uninterrupted free markets, import, price support, investment on technological 
innovation, input subsidy, and some mix of these policy options.  The effect of these 
options on consumers’ and producers’ welfare, government cost, and foreign 
exchange and input requirements are quantified, and compared with an alternative 
policy of free market mechanism. 
If wheat was imported, only consumers gained while other parties, i.e., 
government and producer, had to pay for it.  The consumer’s gain was higher than 
the total loss to the government and producer together.  Therefore, a positive rate of 
return of 58 percent was generated by the policy.  Under input subsidy, again 
consumers gained at the cost to both producers and government.  The consumer’s 
gain is higher than the total loss to the government and producers together.  Again, 
the policy resulted in a positive rate of return of 28 percent on government’s 
investment, but it is less than half of the rate of return as compared to the import 
option.  However, net gain to the society is higher in the latter case. In case of price 
support, both producer and consumer benefitted at the government cost, and the 
policy produced a negative rate of return to the society.  A dilemma in combining the 
price support and input subsidy policies with a different proportion is: Who should 
benefit at what cost?  The highest rate of return is obtained when only the import 
option is followed, but producer’s benefits are negative.  On the other hand, negative 
return is obtained when only price support is implemented, but producers’ share is 
the highest in the surplus generated by the policy.  However, net benefits to the 
society are the highest when each import and input subsidy is expected to generate 
50 percent of the deficit, but the highest rate of return is observed when the deficit is 
filled by importing 80 percent—and the remaining 20 percent by input subsidy 
(Table 4).  In case all three policies are combined together in different proportions, 
the maximum benefits to the society is observed when each import, input subsidy, 
and price support policy contributes 40 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of the Wheat Self-sufficiency and Their Likely Impacts  221
deficit (Table 5) while the highest rate of return takes place when the import and 
each input subsidy and price support policy contributes 80 percent and 10 percent 
respectively.  The appropriate combination depends on the welfare function faced by 
the government for various sections of the society.  The technological change, which 
is purely based on research, is expected to generate benefits to all groups of the 
society and is likely to produce the highest rate of return to all the policy options, 
specifically in the long run.  Nagy (1991) and Azam, et al. (1991) estimated the rate 
of return to investment on wheat research as 60 percent and 76 percent, respectively, 
in Pakistani environment.  
The import at the existing international prices and the input subsidy generates 
net benefit to the society, while price support gives net loss to the society.  The best 
policy to provide higher wheat supplies at lower prices and to improve the welfare of 
both consumers and producers is to invest on agricultural research and irrigation 
infrastructure in the long run; but for the short run, the best policy is the combined 
policy.  The input subsidy can be selected as a second-best option for the short run 
because of a higher net return as compared to import and prices support option.   
Governments of developing countries like Pakistan operate under budgetary 
constraints and the policy-makers have to consider the government’s budgetary 
situation before picking any policy among the available options. In case of serious 
budgetary constraint, it is not rational to fill the total gap between supply and 
demand through price support policy; but at the same time, it is also important to 
consider the distribution of benefits among consumers and producers.  This problem 
can be handled with the help of a combined policy option (Tables 4 and 5), by 
selecting the most desirable combination of two or three combined policy options.   
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